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Abstract 
Research involving human subjects is much more stringently regulated than many other non-
research activities which appear to be at least as risky. A number of prominent figures now 
argue that research is over-regulated. 
We  argue  that  the  reasons  typically  offered  to  justify  the  present  system  of  research 
regulation fail to show that research should be subject to more stringent regulation than other 
equally risky activities. However there are three often overlooked reasons for thinking that 
research should be treated as a special case. First, research typically involves the imposition 
of risk on people who do not benefit from this risk imposition. Second, research depends on 
public  trust.  Third,  the  complexity  of  the  moral  decision  making  required  favours  ethics 
committees as a regulative solution for research.
 
1 INTRODUCTION
The  past  forty  years  have  seen  a  massive  expansion  in  the  ethical  scrutiny  of  medical 
research. All medical research in many countries now has to be reviewed and approved by a 
research ethics committee (REC) or Institutional Review Board (IRB) before any contact with 
human subjects is allowed to commence.1 A great deal of emphasis is placed on the informed 
consent of participants, and there are also requirements for ethics approval before a study can 
be published – so even if for some reason there was no prior requirement to seek approval 
1 In the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand these committees are referred to as Research 
Ethics Committees, whilst in the United States they are referred to as Institutional Review Boards. We will 
be using the terms interchangeably and will primarily use either research ethics committee or REC to refer 
to whichever committee is responsible for the ethical review of research. 
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from an  ethics  committee,  it  will  typically  be  impossible  to  publish  a  piece  of  medical 
research without it  having been approved by an ethics committee.  In many countries  this 
system has recently been expanded into other university based human participant research 
either  formally  via  legislation  such  as  in  Australia  or  informally  via  self  regulation  by 
universities  and  funding  bodies  making  approval  from  a  university  ethics  committee  a 
precondition of starting work on any project involving human subjects.2 
This  system  of  regulation  for  research  is  rather  more  stringent  than  the  systems  of 
regulation we have in place for many other activities which seem to involve the imposition of 
similar or greater risks. In both the US and the UK we currently see a backlash against this 
apparent over-regulation of research.  (See for example Warlow 2005; Stewart  et  al  2008; 
Sullivan 2008; Dyer and Demeritt 2008) 
There are three responses we could make to this ‘over-regulation’ charge. First, we could 
argue that we are too lax in the way we regulate various other activities and that we should 
regulate them more stringently to bring them into line with the way we regulate research. 
Second, we could argue that we are too stringent in the way we currently regulate research, 
and we should relax our research regulations to bring them into line with the way we regulate 
other  activities.  Third,  we could  argue  that  there  are  sound ethical  reasons  why research 
merits stringent regulation despite the fact that it is no riskier than many other activities which 
2 What specifically is legally required in terms of approval for research depends on jurisdiction. In 
almost all jurisdictions some or much of medical research is legally required to seek ethical approval. In 
some jurisdictions such as the United States and Australia university based non-medical research is legally 
required to seek ethical approval. In others such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand there is no 
formal legal requirement to seek ethical approval for university based research unless it is medical research 
or research in an area which is covered by legislation (human tissue and research involving people lacking 
the mental capacity to consent). A relatively complete listing of legislation governing research can be found 
in OHRP (2009).
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we do not regulate stringently. We call this third approach research exceptionalism. 
This  article  provides  a  qualified  defence  of  research  exceptionalism.  Sections  2 and 3 
provide the necessary background. Section 2 contextualises research ethics within the broader 
field of risk regulation, whilst Section 3 makes the case that our current system of research 
regulation seems to be anomalous when compared to the way we regulate other types of risk. 
Section 4 examines six arguments commonly given in favour of current systems of research 
regulation and concludes that none justifies us in thinking that research is exceptional.  In 
Section 5 we advance three arguments which seem to us to be more promising in justifying 
research exceptionalism. 
2 REGULATING RISK
In this article, we use the term ‘risk’ in a nontechnical sense, to refer to “situations in which is 
it possible, but not certain that some undesirable event will occur.”3 (Hansson 2007a) The 
3 Hence our usage of the term is to be distinguished from that deployed in technical writing in risk, 
which distinguishes risk from hazard. In this literature, risk refers to cases where we can assign known 
probabilities to a given event – for example, a coin toss – whereas hazard refers to cases where we are 
unable to assign probabilities. Given that a good part of what makes research research is the fact that we 
lack knowledge about what the effects of our intervention will be, the regulation of research will tend to be 
focused more on hazard than risk. However we have decided (as in common in philosophical discussions) 
nonetheless to prefer the term risk, but with the proviso that we shall use it in a broad way which also 
encompasses hazard. 
There is a further complication here which we shall largely ignore: we have not specified to 
whom the event needs to be undesirable. For instance, no doubt tobacco executives all across the US and 
Europe are currently working to avoid what they perceive as an undesirable event, namely losses to their 
long term profitability caused by the greater focus on tobacco as a public health issue. We would consider 
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nature  of  research  as  an  activity  makes  talking  about  “the  risks  involved  in  research” 
potentially ambiguous. In many cases doing research involves performing actions which are 
indistinguishable  from other  actions  which  are  performed  in  a  non-research  context.  For 
example, suppose there are currently two different treatments, A and B, for a given condition, 
and a research team want to  discover which is  the more effective.  At the moment,  some 
doctors favor A over B, and others favor B over A. The research protocol involves cluster 
randomization, so that half the hospitals in the trial area will, for the period of the research, 
offer treatment B, whilst the other half will offer treatment A. Patients will not be made aware 
that they are part of a research study. 
In a case like this, it may be that both A and B are quite risky procedures: it may be, for 
instance, that A and B are different methods of operating on large gunshot wounds. But it 
would not follow from this that the research was in and of itself was risky: if the patients who 
are  participants  in  the  research  would  otherwise  have  received  either  treatment  A  or  B, 
depending on the subjective judgment of the doctor, then we cannot plausibly claim that the 
risks  involved  in  being  subjected  to  either  treatment  A  or  treatment  B  are  risks of  the 
research, given that these risks would have been present even if the research project had not 
been undertaken. Insofar as research is ethically problematic it must be because it introduces 
new risks that would not otherwise be present.4 
this to be a risk management problem, despite the fact that the measures to reduce smoking which are 
undesirable from the tobacco executive’s perspective, are presumably desirable from a more objective 
perspective. However in this article we are interested in which risks we should be aiming to regulate as a 
society, and so we will focus only on events which would be undesirable from the perspective of a just 
society.
4 In the case of this study we might argue, for instance, that the quality of the care the patients receive 
would in some sense be compromised by the research process, or that the fact of their treatment being 
randomised without their consent wrongs them even if it does not harm them.
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The Idea of Regulation
Regulation, as we shall use it in this article, is a normative activity which aims to steer the 
behavior of human beings, in order that a desired goal is either achieved or approached more 
closely. Regulation in this sense covers a broad range of activities. Here is a small sample of 
common ways in which we regulate: 
A. Prospective regulation: Regulation that requires a check to ensure it is being followed 
before the activity is undertaken. 
B. Reactive regulation: In contrast to prospective regulation, reactive regulation only takes 
effect if the appropriate standard is breached. 
C.  Licensing: Regulation  by  testing  operators  and  then  trusting  them to  carry  out  the 
activity appropriately. 
D. Dip  sticking: Regulation  which  randomly  tests  a  sample  of  those  carrying  out  the 
activity to ensure it is being done in accordance with the appropriate standards. 
E. Financial incentives: Indirect regulation by making the desired choice more financially 
attractive (For instance, raising the tax on petrol to encourage the use of fuel efficient cars). 
F. Architectural nudges: Changing the environment in which choices are made in such a 
way as to load the dice in favor of the desired result. For instance, a school cafeteria places 
the healthier items at the front so people are more likely to choose them. (Sunstein and Thaler 
2008) 
The regulation  of  a  particular  activity  might  well  involve  a  mix  of  different  forms of 
regulation, so for example driving and road safety are regulated both via standard setting with 
testing of drivers but also with the reactive forces of the courts if someone is found to not be 
maintaining the appropriate level (which itself is often determined by a form of dip sticking, 
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namely  a  limited  number  of  police  observing  some,  but  not  all  motorist  activity). 
Architectural and financial considerations also sometimes play a role: for instance there will 
typically be fines to discourage undesired driving behavior, and some cars are built to make 
an annoying sound if they are moving without the driver wearing his seatbelt. 
Regulating risk vs the risks of regulation
Where there are undesirable events that it is possible but not certain will happen, and it is 
within our power to prevent or mitigate these events, then there is an intuitive obviousness to 
the idea that we should aim to regulate in some way to ensure that we either prevent these 
events from occurring or mitigate them if they do. 
However it is important to note that the act of regulating a particular risk will typically 
introduce further risks. Amongst the downsides of regulation we need to consider are first its 
financial  costs:  if  we choose  to  regulate  a  domain,  we typically  need  to  set  up  relevant 
regulatory standards and monitor compliance with them, train people to comply with these 
standards, and punish non-compliers.5 Second regulation will often have specifically moral 
costs: for example curtailing liberty. 
Regulation can also have more subtle downsides: regulating a system with a particular 
standard can create perverse incentives and will often have the side effect of making it more 
difficult to meet other desirable goals.6 Different types of regulation will have different types 
of moral  and financial  costs:  for example,  banning an activity  outright  is  a much greater 
5 For example it has been estimated that it costs £800 for a research ethics committee to consider an 
application and £850 for a researcher to prepare it. (Arshad and Arkwright, 2008)
6 For instance, if we regulate to reduce speed in built up areas by installing a large number of road 
humps, this is likely to increase the risk that people being rushed to hospital for emergency treatment will 
die on the way.
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imposition on liberty than attempting to nudge people towards a desirable goal. 
A particular piece of regulation R is morally justified only where it meets three criteria. 
The first and most obvious criterion is that the goal towards which we are trying to steer 
people must be desirable (or at least not undesirable). Second, the likely effects of regulating 
the activity in question with R (with its attendant moral costs) must be morally better than 
adopting a laissez-faire attitude towards the activity in question. Third, given that the goal is 
worth obtaining, and that R would be morally superior to a laissez faire approach, we need 
also to be convinced that R is morally superior to (or at least not inferior to) any rival ways of 
regulating R1 … Rn. 
The third criterion is the most ethically complex to apply. There will be some easy cases 
where two methods of regulating differ only in one way (perhaps R1 and R2 are identical in 
every way but for the fact that R2 is ten times as expensive as R1). But we are likely to find 
that there are cases where things are less clear. For instance, R1 might be more effective in 
obtaining the desired state of affairs than R2, but be accompanied by rather higher moral costs. 
In order to work out whether a given mode of regulation for a particular risk is superior to 
all others, we would need an account of what makes one risk worse than another. Ideally, such 
an account would have two features: first, it would be fully alive to all the ethical features 
which make one risk worse than another (call this the accuracy requirement), and second, it 
would enable us to make useful comparative judgments about which of two risks is worse 
from an ethical point of view (call this the indexing requirement). However, the accuracy and 
the indexing requirements conflict. The indexing requirement will tend to push us towards an 
account  of  risk  where  everything  about  risk  is  commensurable.7 However,  the  accuracy 
7 This is because (as Wolff and de Shalit put it in a slightly different context), ‘if two goods, or two 
forms of advantage and disadvantage, cannot be compared, then they cannot be placed on a common scale, 
and so it will become impossible, in many cases, to say whether one person is worse off or better off than 
8
requirement will tend to push us towards an account in which some elements of relevance to 
the ethical regulation of risk are partially or fully incommensurable. 
At  least  three  factors  threaten  the  ethical  commensurability  of  risk.  First,  it  is  unclear 
whether it is always appropriate to treat a small risk of a very undesirable event occurring as 
commensurable with a rather larger risk of a much less undesirable event occurring; and even 
if it is, how we should commensurate.8 Second, it is unclear to what extent it is legitimate to 
commensurate risks across separate people. Is it legitimate to compare a low risk of a mildly 
bad event happening to a large number of people, with a high risk of something very bad 
happening to a single person; and if so, how do we perform these calculations? Third, it is 
unclear how we should account for consent to risk. Intuitively, there is a moral difference 
between the same level of risk of death, as assumed by a mountaineer, as compared to the 
same level of risk of death caused by contamination in the water supply; but it is far from 
clear how we should factor in consent into our overall judgment about how bad a particular 
risk is.9 
In the light of these difficulties it is extremely difficult to provide a full and convincing 
another’ (2007, 23)
8 One obvious way is to do an expected utility calculation, by multiplying the probability of the bad 
event occurring, by the disutility of its occurrence, to give an expected utility score. However it is far from 
clear that this is the best way to treat risk. As Wolff points out, it does not seem irrational for someone to be 
willing to suffer a one in two million chance of death for £1, but not to be willing to suffer a one in two 
chance of death for £1,000,000; let alone £2,000,000 for their certain death. (2006, 61)
9 In addition, in real world contexts we will typically be acting in the face of hazard, rather than risk and 
so will not be in a position to judge accurately the probability either that the possible undesirable effects 
will obtain unless we act, or the likely effectiveness of our attempts to prevent the undesirable events. 
Hence even if we do think that we can provide an accurate index which will rank risks, given their 
probabilities, we may not be in a position to rank them on the basis of the information available to us.
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account of what makes one risk ethically worse than another. Certainly those who argue that 
research is currently over-regulated have not done so. Presumably they think that just as we 
do not need a fully worked out account of justice before we can point out manifest injustices, 
so we do not need a fully worked out account of the ethics of risk to notice that the way we 
currently regulate research is grossly disproportional. The next section examines the case for 
thinking research is overregulated. 
3 WHY THE REGULATION OF RESEARCH MAY APPEAR TO BE 
DISPROPORTIONAL
Research ethics  committee review requires the researcher  to formalize their  project  in an, 
often lengthy, application form.10 Researchers then have to wait until the committee meets and 
makes a decision and must then revise their project in line with the recommendations of the 
committee before they are allowed to start their research proper. Depending on the system, 
they may also have obligations to report back to the committee on a regular basis. Hence 
regulation by research ethics committee is a very unusual and burdensome form of regulation. 
It is usually assumed that research in the relevant sense is defined by its aim: namely to 
extend  “a  body  of  knowledge  by  means  of  a  scientifically  respectable  methodology.” 
(Bortolotti and Heinrichs 2007, 157) Acting with the aim of extending a body of knowledge is 
not, in general, ethically undesirable.11 Hence it is unclear why the attempt to extend a body of 
knowledge ought to be taken as a marker of special moral qualms. 
10 In the UK the present National Health Service’s Research Ethics Committee approval form is 34 
pages long and must be accompanied by an information sheet, consent form and a research protocol.
11 There are cases where a body of knowledge (such as body of knowledge which constitutes the 
science of torture) is so ethically problematic that it is wrong in itself to attempt to extend it. But very little, 
if any, of the research examined by ethics committees falls into this category. 
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This complaint of the overregulation of research is at its most powerful when it is pointed 
out that it will often be the case that precisely the same activity could be carried out by the 
same people but would not require (at least according to most systems of research regulation) 
the same level of intrusive regulation as long as no attempt was being made to derive new 
generalizable knowledge from the activity. So for example audit activities (which are often 
hard to distinguish from research) are frequently excluded from research ethics regulation 
despite involving almost identical activities.12 Likewise experimental last hope treatments are 
also often excluded from being considered research because they are typically small scale 
(single patient) and thus not generalizable.13 
One possible reply to these cases is that  they play on the ambiguity  of the concept of 
research: and one response (which we would be sympathetic to) would be to argue that audit 
and innovative treatments really are a form of research, and so should be regulated in the 
same way as research. However, there are plenty of less ambiguous cases – where we have 
activities which are clearly not research, but which nonetheless impose similar or greater risks 
than much research, but which are typically not nearly so stringently regulated.  We could 
have chosen any number of such examples, but we will choose four for indicative purposes. 
1. Journalism: journalists routinely seek out and interview members of the public, without 
12 Presumably because the information generated by an audit is not generalizable new knowledge but 
rather assessment of a local situation and whether it is meeting some preset standard. For further on the 
audit/research distinction, see Cave and Nichols (2008), Holm (2007), and Holm and Bortolotti (2007). 
13 A further peculiarity of the current systems of research scrutiny is that projects may get described as 
research even if they do not fall under the above definition, for example student research projects even if 
they are effectively audits are often assessed by research ethics systems precisely because they are 
described as research projects. Likewise the work of academics such as those in the visual or performing 
arts sometimes are scrutinized by research ethics committees despite there being no attempt to create 
generalizable knowledge as part of the process. 
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seeking  any  ethical  approval  from  anyone  either  before  starting  their  article  or  before 
publication.  Researchers,  whether  in  universities  or  a  medical  environment  typically  do 
require ethical approval before they are allowed to interview subjects. 
2.  Reality  TV  Shows:  makers  of  reality  TV  shows  routinely  place  contestants  in 
environments which are much more stressful than ones which would be allowed by most 
university ethics committees;  and such shows are not typically  subject  to stringent ethical 
regulation.14 
3.  Dangerous sports:  ethics committees will frequently prevent a research project from 
going ahead on the grounds that it  is too risky. However the risks that  ethics committees 
consider to be too great are often rather small in comparison with other types of activities – 
such as mountaineering, or sky-diving – which are either not regulated at all,  or regulated 
much less stringently than research. 
4. Government action: governments frequently impose risks on their citizens (for instance 
by privatizing nationalized industries, or by cutting welfare payments). Those on whom these 
risks are imposed very rarely have the opportunity to opt out of the risks on an individual 
basis;  and certainly  no attempt  is  made to  ensure  that  the  informed  consent  of  all  those 
affected is obtained. Conversely, ethics committees are very wary about allowing research to 
go ahead without the informed consent of all participants. 
We agree with the proponents of the overregulation thesis that that such examples create a 
powerful  prima  facie  case  that  we  currently  treat  research  as  an  exceptional  case. 
Overregulation is  a morally  significant  problem, because of the financial  and moral  costs 
associated with regulation. We could reply in one of three ways: we could concede that our 
14 For instance, TV shows routinely reenact problematic pieces of research, such as Milgram’s 
Obedience to Authority experiments, without seeking approval from an ethics committee before doing so. 
Note that these experiments would probably not be approved by any ethics committee now. 
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principles for the regulation of research should be of the same type as those we use to regulate 
other kinds of activities and then seek to either (a) “level down” our regulation of research to 
the level of other activities or to (b) “level up” our regulation of other activities to that of 
research. The third option – which we explore in this article – is to argue that despite initial 
appearances there are good reasons to treat research as exceptional. 
4 SIX UNSUCCESSFUL ARGUMENTS FOR RESEARCH 
EXCEPTIONALISM
In order to justify research exceptionalism we would need to demonstrate that there is some 
feature  of  research  which  makes  stringent  regulation  appropriate.  If  this  feature  is  only 
sometimes  true  of  research,  then  it  is  unclear  that  it  could  justify  regulating  all  research 
everywhere stringently. In particular, if the feature cited is shared with other contexts which 
we  do  not  want  to  regulate  as  stringently,  then  we  will  not  have  justified  research 
exceptionalism. It should be noted however that even if research exceptionalism is justified, it 
will not necessarily follow that we should have research ethics committees.15 So while an 
argument for the regulation of research via research ethics committees will be dependent on 
the success of a justification of research exceptionalism, it does not at least straightforwardly 
follow from that justification. 
We shall examine a number of arguments which have been (or could plausibly be) put 
forward to justify research exceptionalism. The first type of argument commonly offered for 
research ethics review can be disposed rapidly since it will not serve for these purposes. These 
are pragmatic arguments based around present regulations and requirements. So for example 
15 Presumably driving ought to be regulated fairly stringently; but there is no need for driving ethics 
committees.
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the 1975 revision of the Declaration of Helsinki introduced the notion of a formal independent 
committee review of research: 
The design and performance  of each experimental  procedure involving human 
subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which should be 
transmitted  to  a  specially  appointed  independent  committee  for  consideration, 
comment and guidance. (World Medical Association 1975)
In  response  to  this  requirement  two groups,  journals  and  research  funders,  often  now 
require research ethics review before they will publish or fund research respectively. (See for 
example  Committee  on  Publication  Ethics  2006,  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council 
2005) However this pragmatic explanation of the need for the regulation of research is clearly 
insufficient to justify research exceptionalism. This is because the drafters of the Declaration 
of Helsinki could have been mistaken; and if research exceptionalism is not justified then 
these requirements are not justified. In other words these pragmatic arguments are parasitic on 
the success of a substantive argument for research exceptionalism. 
The History of Research Ethics Abuses
Research,  in  particular  medical  research,  has  something  of  a  checkered  past  with several 
significant cases of highly unethical  research having been carried out such as the medical 
experimentation in Nazi Germany, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Willowbrook State 
School Hepatitis Studies.16 Amongst the social sciences, the Stanford Prison study and the 
Tearoom Trade study deserve mention as well. (Zimbardo 2007; Humphreys 1975) 
Behind these prominent historical abuses lie a whole further world of less famous ones. In 
16 For a concise overview of the history of research ethics, see Schüklenk (2005).
14
the UK, Maurice Pappworth (1962, 1967) published his concerns about the ethics of several 
pieces of research being carried out at the time, and followed this five years later with a book. 
In the USA, Henry Beecher (1966) drew attention to 22 cases of seriously unethical studies 
which  had  been  published  in  top  medical  journals.  These  cases  were  not  necessarily  as 
unethical as Nazi experimentation but were perhaps more troublesome in some ways because 
they were so ubiquitous.  For example,  Jenny Hazelgrove  relays  in  an excellent  historical 
paper the following story told by a British medical student in the 1950s: 
When I was a student at St Thomas’s we had a professor of medicine who used 
to ask patients before they went under the anaesthetic “would you mind if while 
you are asleep we took a few blood samples?” What he didn’t mention was that 
those samples was going to come from inside the heart and that he was going to 
push a cardiac catheter up the vein into the heart and this had a certain mortality 
rate. (Hazelgrove 2002, p. 123)
These  cases  do  provide  prima  facie  evidence  that  unregulated  research  can  be  abused. 
However they fall short of demonstrating the case for research exceptionalism because of two 
factors. Firstly they do not show that these risks are specific to research: abuses can and have 
occurred in many other areas of human existence. Second, they do not show that regulation 
will prevent these abuses. To justify research exceptionalism we need to demonstrate  that 
there are risks that are either specific to research or are more likely in research. 
Risks of harm to participants
Another  argument  for  research  exceptionalism  appeals  to  the  risks  of  harm  to  research 
participants.  Research  can  be  extremely  risky:  research  participants  have  died  or  been 
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seriously injured by participating in research. (Savulescu 2001; Suntharalingam et al 2006) 
But there are many other activities which also involve risk of harm. Many everyday activities 
involve some risks of harm and while some of these are regulated (such as driving) others are 
unregulated. It is not clear that research per se is specifically risky, even if some instances of 
research are particularly risky. Much research - in particular a considerable amount of survey 
based research seems - barring the risk of a paper cut - almost entirely risk free. 
Difficulty in understanding research protocols
However it  might  be pointed out that  not only are there risks in research but that  people 
frequently have difficulty understanding research protocols. There is now substantial evidence 
that people confuse research with other activities such as therapy (known as the therapeutic 
misconception) and that people are at least some of the time unaware they are participating in 
research. (Appelbaum et al. 1987, Snowdon et al. 1997, Dawson 2004) This evidence ought 
not  to  be  surprising,  given that  research  is  often complex  and involves  concepts  such as 
randomization  and  double  blind  trials  which  are  not  familiar  in  everyday  life.17 The 
implication of this is that people may take those risks without truly comprehending them. It 
might be argued that we should not allow people to make significant life choices without fully 
understanding the potential consequences for their lives. 
However,  whilst  research  protocols  may  be  difficult  to  understand  they  are  no  more 
difficult and often considerably less difficult to understand than many official documents such 
as the fine print on mortgage documentation. As such the brute fact of difficulty does not on 
its own justify research exceptionalism. 
17 For some of the empirical evidence, see Featherstone and Donovan (2002). For philosophical 
reflection on what this should mean for our attempts to gain informed consent, see Dawson (2009).
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A subsidiary concern of the difficulty in understanding research protocols is that people 
may engage in research for the wrong reasons. There are two versions of this concern, the first 
focused on undue inducement, the second on exploitation. 
Undue Inducement
One risk that is sometimes thought to be present in research is the risk of undue inducement. 
(Martin  2005)  Undue inducement  is  said to  occur when an offer of money overpowers a 
person’s  faculty  of  rational  choice  in  such  a  way  that  they  fail  to consider  the  risks 
appropriately, and instead perform the activity because of the inducement. There have been 
several papers questioning whether this ought to be considered ethically problematic, since it 
is unclear  what precisely is  wrong about inducements  in research.  (Wilkinson and Moore 
1997, 1999; Emanuel 2004) In any case for our purposes given that inducement is a common 
element  of human life  it  seems difficult  to  see what would be uniquely worrisome about 
inducement in research. Working life often involves inducements and in particular sometimes 
involves inducements for engaging in risky working behavior (so called “danger money”). 
Though not all risky jobs attract an absolute high wage they do in general attract a relatively 
high wage compared to work that is equivalent but without the risk. If we are to complain 
about inducement in research it seems apt to consider it elsewhere as well. 
Risk of exploitation
Related  to  the risk of  inducement  is  the risk of  exploitation  in research.  (Ashcroft  2001) 
Exploitation occurs when one party to an interaction relies on a weakness – whether cognitive 
or in power relations – of the other to create an unfair bargain, in which the distribution of the 
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benefits from the interaction disproportionately favors the exploiter. 
However, as in the other cases we have examined, the possibility of exploitation is in no 
way unique to research: exploitation is endemic wherever we find people who are powerless. 
None  of  the  arguments  for  research  exceptionalism  we  have  examined  so  far  are 
compelling.  This  is  not  because  they  have  failed  to  identify  ethically  worrisome 
characteristics of some research, but instead because it has not been established that these 
characteristics are either unique to research or more common or significant in research than in 
other less regulated arenas. The next three arguments, however, are more promising as they 
identify specific elements of research that are distinct from other areas. 
5 THREE BETTER ARGUMENTS FOR RESEARCH EXCEPTIONALISM
The aim of research is different from other activities which impose risk 
The aim of research is different from other contexts with similar risks such as health care.18 
This is  because research does not (in general)  aim specifically  to benefit  the participants: 
instead the aim is to generate knowledge. This is of course not always the case with research: 
sometimes the research is intended to benefit the participants. Nonetheless it is generally true 
that the benefits of research mostly accrue to others than those taking the risks of research. 
This  is  ethically  significant,  as  Hansson  and  Hermansson  (2007)  argue  plausibly  that 
whether the person who is subjected to a risk also benefits from that risk is an important factor 
in the ethics of risk management. On their account, in any risk management problem there are 
18 See Hunter, D. 2007. Proportional ethical review and the identification of ethical issues. Journal of 
Medical Ethics 33: 241-245.
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three parties. First, there are those on whom the risk is imposed; second there are those who 
control  the  risk;  and  third  there  are  those  who  benefit  from  the  risk.  Risks  are  least 
problematic  where  the  same  person fills  all  three  roles:  where  one  and the  same person 
benefits from the risk, and can control the risk that they are exposing themselves to. Most 
ethically problematic are those cases where the risk-exposed neither benefit from their risk 
exposure nor can control their  exposure to the risk. Research participants typically do not 
benefit  from being in research; and whilst  informed consent procedures and the ability to 
withdraw from research give them some control over the risk they are running, the difficulty 
of understanding research protocols mean that they have less control over the risk than would 
be ideal.19 
Whilst the combination of risk imposition with no expected benefit and little control over 
the risk is  by no means  unique to  research,  it  is  a  feature  which  does  seem to us  to  be 
sufficiently characteristic of research to at least partially justify more stringent regulation in 
the case of research, in particular in regards to ensuring that the level of risk is communicated 
clearly to potential research participants. 
Research is dependent on public trust
To be carried out successfully research relies on public trust. Public trust is important both in 
terms of the public support for the funding of research and in terms of members of the public 
choosing  to  participate  in  research.  Even  just  one  scandal  can  significantly  decrease  the 
willingness of a population to participate in research as has been shown in America with the 
damage Tuskegee has done to the willingness of African-Americans to participate in research. 
19 Athanassoulis N. and Wilson J. 2009. When is Deception in Research Ethical? Clinical Ethics 4(1): 
44-49.
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(Corbie-Smith et al. 1999) 
It could be argued that regulation helps support public trust in research in two ways. Firstly 
it is hoped that research ethics committees might prevent at least some of the more flagrant 
and newsworthy ethical abuses by researchers. Thus regulation may have a protective effect 
on public trust, preventing it from being eroded in the first place. Secondly the regulation of 
research might have a restorative effect,  especially if it  comes in response to a breach of 
public trust. (van den Hoonaard 2001; Fitzgerald 2005) 
While this does seem to give some reason for research exceptionalism it will only be a 
compelling  reason  if  either  there  were  strong  evidence  that  research  ethics  committees 
prevented research ethics scandals or that the public are both generally aware of the existence 
of research ethics committees and find the notion reassuring. There is little present evidence 
that this  is  the case however:  most people outside of research have never heard of them. 
Nonetheless it does seem to support a partial justification of research exceptionalism. 
Professional ethics for researchers.
Professionals  have  specific  ethical  obligations  related  to  their  professional  roles,  and 
researchers are no exception. Obviously those obligations include ethical duties towards their 
research participants. However we shall argue that determining the extent and scope of these 
duties is complex and cannot with a satisfactory degree of confidence be carried out by an 
individual  researcher  or  non-expert  research  team  and  would  better  be  carried  out  by  a 
research ethics committee. 
There are two steps to this argument. The first appeals to the complexity and difficulties of 
making  ethical  decisions  in  situations  of  fundamental  uncertainty  such  as  those  faced  in 
research. The second adds further complexity and difficulty by acknowledging the existence 
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of different competing ethical norms and theories and the need for some acceptable resolution 
between these norms. In the face of these two factors we argue that researchers will often be 
in a poor position to assess the ethical  implications  of their  own research,  and given the 
stringent nature of their duties towards research participants, and the likelihood of research 
ethics  committees  making  both  better  and  more  democratically  legitimate  decisions  than 
individual researchers this gives a reason to support this form of regulation for research. 
Uncertainty and Research
Uncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of research. We literally do not know what the 
outcome of research will be: that is why the research is being carried out. This uncertainty 
makes the research unpredictable in two important ways. First, it makes the potential benefits 
of  the  research  difficult  to  weigh;  second,  it  makes  the  potential  harms  to  the  research 
participant difficult to weigh. This is important because the risks of the research need to be 
weighed against the benefits, and given that both the risks and the benefits are often uncertain 
this is very difficult. 
Milgram’s Obedience to Authority experiments,20 which were designed to test the subjects’ 
willingness to obey authority provide a good example. Milgram was interested to discover 
how far a research subject would go in carrying out a series of increasingly callous orders, 
delivering what they believed to be electric shocks to someone they took to be a recalcitrant 
learner. Before carrying out this research Milgram asked various psychologist and psychiatrist 
colleagues (and some of his psychology Majors) how many people would continue to obey 
the authority figure’s commands right to the end, by which time they would be administering 
what they took to be a shock of 450 volts. (Milgram 1963) They thought that only a tiny 
20 A fuller explanation of the experiments can be found in Milgram 1974.
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percentage would be willing to go this far; in actuality about 65% of people were willing to go 
all the way. In terms of predicting the potential or likely harms that is a big gap. And that is 
the point, the results of research are unknown at the outset which makes assessing its ethical 
acceptability much more difficult. 
Ethical regulation in pluralistic societies
Weighing and specifying the different ethical values in play is also rather complex. While 
there are some well  known and agreed upon standards in research ethics,  there are many 
issues in research ethics where there is not one settled agreed upon answer. Further, even 
where there is agreement on principles, there will often be considerable disagreement at an 
underlying theoretical level, and these disagreements may surface when principles come to be 
put into practice. Nonetheless answers, at least for the moment, must be provided. Whilst it is 
possible that researchers will have been provided some training in ethics and the ethics of 
research,  as  well  as  acquired  knowledge  of  this  on  the  job,  they  are  unlikely  to  have  a 
significant expertise in ethical issues. This means that they ought to be skeptical whether they 
are sufficiently aware of the ethical issues that a particular research project raises. This is 
particularly the case since there is evidence that even experienced members of research ethics 
committees miss what they consider to be significant ethical issues with research projects on 
occasion.21 
21 See Elliott, L. and Hunter, D. 2008. The experiences of ethics committee members: contradictions 
between individuals and committees. Journal of Medical Ethics 34: 489-494. It might be questioned 
whether research ethics committees are more likely to make ethically defensible judgments. However it 
seems likely that they will be more reliable, given the plurality of different views represented on an ethics 
committee, the variety of experience and expertise in considering and identifying ethical issues in research 
and general arguments from political philosophy such as Condorcet Jury Theorem supporting the notion 
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Even if despite this the individual researcher feels confident in making their own ethical 
judgment about the project there is a further problem of the acceptability of their decision for 
others in society. 
This  problem is  characterized  by  the  existence  of  multiple  different  defensible  ethical 
positions. This leaves us with a decision problem in public decision making: which ethical 
view ought we base our decisions on given that no position has universal appeal? In political 
philosophy the typical response to this problem has been to insist on neutrality by the state 
towards questions where there is genuine ethical disagreement. Regardless of how viable this 
strategy might be at the level of choosing political principles, at the level of ethical review to 
choose neutrality towards contested ethical principles would rather miss the point. (Ashcroft 
2008; Mulgan 1999) An individual researcher will be hard pressed to represent a compromise 
position  between  these  different  viewpoints.  However,  democratically  set  regulations  can 
represent a compromise position particularly if like the current regulation of research each 
project is looked at individually.22 
Thus  a  relatively  strong  case  for  research  exceptionalism  can  be  derived.  Given  the 
professional  obligations  of  researchers  towards  the  appropriate  treatment  of  research 
participants,  the  fundamental  uncertainty  involved  in  research,  the  complexity  of  ethical 
decision making both in terms establishing reliable judgments and democratically defensible 
that groups will generally be more reliable decision makers than individuals.  See Hunter, D. 2007. 
Proportional ethical review and the identification of ethical issues. Journal of Medical Ethics 33: 241-245.
22 It might be argued that professional bodies have codes of ethics which are a form of compromise 
position which may (if the profession knows what is good for it) represent the public’s view. To some 
degree this is true, however codes of ethics are blunt tools which require interpretation. The more complex 
the situation, the less use they will be in providing either reassurance or guidance. Given the complexity 
and variety of research, professional code of ethics will only go so far in terms of removing the need for 
regulation, and ethical review by committee will be needed.
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judgments, it seems that the research ethics committee might be seen as a vehicle to allow 
researchers to fulfill their ethical obligations to research participants. 
6 CONCLUSION
Amongst the several factors we have considered, three have stood out as providing a better 
justification for thinking that research should be subject to exceptional regulation of the kind 
ethics committees provide. First, research typically involves the imposition of risk on people 
who do not benefit from this risk imposition. In an ideal case, this would be mitigated by the 
fact that systems of informed consent (and the ability to exit research without sanction) give 
research participants a form of control over their risk exposure. But two factors about the risks 
in research should give us pause here: the inherent difficulty of understanding some elements 
of research enough to give an informed consent (Dawson 2009), and the inherent uncertainty 
of what the research will turn up. 
Second,  the  dependence  of  research  on  public  trust  gives  some  support  for  research 
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exceptionalism. Insofar as regulation builds or maintains public trust this gives a reason to 
treat research differently to other areas. 
Finally  we have seen that  there  may be reasons  of  democratic  legitimacy for favoring 
ethics committees as a regulative solution for research, even if research is not typically more 
dangerous than other activities which are less stringently regulated. So whilst many of the 
reasons that have been put forward for thinking that research is exceptional fail, we think that 
it is too early to presume that research exceptionalism is false.23 
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